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All the ideas for 'The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed]', 'De Anima' and 'works'

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93 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge]
Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle]
Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle]
Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle]
Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle]
Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares]
Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle]
Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle]
Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi]
Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle]
Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle]
The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle]
If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle]
If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle]
What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle]
The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle]
Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle]
Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle]
Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle]
Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle]
Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle]
Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA]